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CASENOTES

ANTITRUST-Neither State Regulatory Agency's Approval
of Electrical Utility's Tariff nor Fact That Program Approved
in Tariff Cannot Be Terminated Until New Tariff Is Approved
Constitutes Sufficient Basis for Implying Exemption From Antitrust Laws for That Program. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. 579 (1976).
The Sherman Antitrust Act' reflects a federal policy favoring free market
competition as the essential regulating force of the economy. 2 Because the
states have been increasingly substituting direct regulation of the economy for
the forces of competition,8 however, the courts have been faced with the task

of accommodating the Sherman Act to the states' legitimate interests 4 in regulating matters of local concern. The result of this judicial process of accommodating conflicting federal and state interests has been the development of
the state action exemption to the antitrust laws. 5 Broadly defined, the exemption frees otherwise unlawful activity from antitrust liability when undertaken
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
2. It should be noted that Congress has granted antitrust exemptions to certain private activities approved by federal agencies. These exemptions are set forth in Pogue,
The Rationale of Exemptions from Antitrust, 19 A.B.A. ANTITRUsT SECTION 313, 330-54

(1961).
3. See Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker
v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71, 79 (1974).
4. Professor Milton Handler has summarized the constitutional requirements for
permissible state regulation:
mhe area regulated [must] be a proper subject of local concern. . . . the
regulation [must] not discriminate against interstate commerce or otherwise
run afoul of the commerce clause, and . . . there [must] be no federal regulatory legislation that either is inconsistent with the state program or manifests
a Congressional intent to preempt the field. (footnotes omitted).
Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1972).
See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349
(1951); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
5. The state action exemption is premised on the view that Congress did not intend
the Sherman Act to apply to restraints of trade imposed by the state acting as sovereign.
See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943), discussed at notes 37-48 infra &
accompanying text. The doctrine represents judicial concern for the principles of federalism by enabling state officials to implement social and economic policies free from
the strictures of the federal antitrust laws.
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pursuant to the legislative command of the state.0 As the doctrine has developed, however, state-sanctioned anticompetitive activity usually has been exempt from federal antitrust laws only where the state has determined that
competition is not desirable in a particular sector of the economy and
has substituted its own regulatory program for the forces of competition. 7 In
applying the exemption, the courts have neither analyzed the adequacy of
the state policy sought to be achieved through the regulatory scheme nor
weighed the sufficiency of this policy against the Sherman Act's aim of encouraging competition.8 Coupled with the states' increased substitution of
regulatory for competitive principles, this broad interpretation of the scope
of the state action exemption has had the effect of placing increasing areas
of economic activity beyond the reach of the antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. 9 however, considerably narrows the scope of the state action exemption by indicating that the mere existence of state regulation alone is insufficient to immunize state-approved anticompetitive activity from the application of the
antitrust laws. Cantor arose from an antitrust action filed by a retail drugstore owner against the Detroit Edison Company, in which it was alleged that
the electrical utility had used its state-sanctioned' monopoly in the distribution of electricity to restrain competition in the sale of light bulbs." Detroit
Edison had been furnishing customers in its marketing area' 2 with approxi6. See 317 U.S. at 350-52.
7. See, e.g., Duke & Co., Inc. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1975) (exemption
inapplicable to private and public parties' conspiracy to boycott plaintiff's beverage sales
in municipal facilities); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424
F.2d 25 (lst Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1972) (no exemption for subversion
of competitive bidding for public swimming pool contract); Asheville Bd. of Trade, Inc.
v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959) (anticompetitive activities of state-created but
privately operated board of trade subject to antitrust laws); United States v. Nat'l Soc'y
of Professional Eng'rs, 389 F. Supp. 1193 (D.D.C. 1974) (no exemption created by state
statutes prohibiting competitive bidding as statutes failed to establish alternate form of
public regulatory control).
8. See Slater, supra note 3, at 91.
9. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
10. A Michigan statute authorizes the replacement of competition with public utility
regulation by granting the Public Service Commission authority to regulate all state utilities. MIcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 460.6 (1967). See also note 15 infra.
11. 428 U.S. at 584. In his complaint, Cantor alleged that Detroit Edison's program of supplying free light bulbs to purchasers of its electricity violated § 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), and § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1970). In the Supreme Court, he additionally alleged that respondent's activities constituted an unlawful tying agreement under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1970). 428 U.S. at 581 n.3.
12. Detroit Edison distributed electricity and light bulbs to approximately five million
people in southeastern Michigan. Id. at 582.
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mately half of their standard sized light bulbs under a program that imposed
3
no separate charge for the bulbs in its customers' monthly electricity bills.'
The utility's rates, which took into account the practice of furnishing light
bulbs without charge, had been approved by the Michigan Public Service
14
Commission and could not be altered without the Commission's approval.
Although the Commission was vested by the legislature with broad powers
to regulate all aspects of the utility's operation,' 5 it had made no specific investigation of the competitive impact of Detroit Edison's light bulb program.16
The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted Detroit
Edison's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the state action exemption 17 and the court of appeals affirmed the ruling in an unpublished
opinion.' 8 The Supreme Court reversed,' 9 holding the state action exemption
inapplicable to Detroit Edison's conduct in implementing and conducting the
light bulb program. 20 In reaching its decision, the Court rejected Detroit Edison's contention that it would be unfair to subject a private citizen to antitrust
liability for merely obeying the command of a state law. 2' The Court reasoned that, even though the light bulb program was subject to the final approval of the Public Service Commission, the program was primarily the
creation and responsibility of Detroit Edison.2 2 The Court thus concluded
that Detroit Edison's role in formulating and conducting the light bulb program was sufficiently dominant to require its conduct to conform to the
13. The cost of Detroit Edison's light bulb plan to the company's consumers was
$2,835,000 a year. The utility company claimed the retail cost of such light bulbs to
be over $6,000,000 a year. Id. at 584 n.9.
14. Detroit Edison's abandonment of the light bulb program without the Commis-

sion's approval would constitute a violation of state law. MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
450.558 .(1967).
15. In granting the Public Service Commission "complete power and jurisdiction to
regulate all public utilities in the state . . ." MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 460.6 (1967),
the Legislature vested it with the authority "to regulate all rates, fares, fees, charges, ser-

vices, rules, conditions of service, and all other matters pertaining to the formation,
operation, or direction of such public utilities." MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 460.6
(1967).
16.
17.
18.
19.

428 U.S. at 584.
392 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975).
The Court's opinion, per Justice Stevens, is divided into four sections: Section

I sets forth the facts of the case; Sections II and IV contain Justice Stevens' interpretation of the proper scope of the state action exemption; and Section III addresses the
resolution of the instant case. Only a plurality of the Court accedes to Justice Stevens'
interpretation of the state action exemption (Brennan, White and Marshall JJ.). Chief
Justice Burger joins with the plurality in Sections I and III of the opinion.
20. 428 U.S. at 598.
21. Id. at 594-95.
22. Id. at 594.
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standards created for unregulated businesses under the antitrust laws. 23
The Court also rejected, on three separate but interrelated grounds, Detroit
Edison's claim that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to apply to conduct already subject to state regulation. 24 The mere fact that conduct is subject to both state regulation and the antitrust laws was not seen as necessarily
subjecting the conduct to inconsistent standards. 25 Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that the mere fact of inconsistency between the state and federal
standard is insufficient to subordinate the federal interest. 2 6 The Court concluded that even if Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to apply to stateregulated conduct, antitrust enforcement would not be precluded in an essen27
tially unregulated market such as that for light bulbs.
The Court in Cantor set out the same standard for determining the proper
cases in which to apply the state action exemption from the antitrust laws 28
as is applied to federal regulatory legislation. Under this standard, an exemption is granted only if necessary to make the regulatory scheme work, "and
even then only to the minimum extent necessary." '29 Applying the standard to
the instant case, the Court concluded that the state's ability to regulate the utility's natural monopoly in the distribution of electricity would be unimpaired
by the application of antitrust principles to the utility's activities in compettive markets.30
23. Id. at 594-95. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that Detroit Edison
had initiated its light program several years before the Commission was created. Id.
24. Id. at 595-97.
25. Id.
26. Id. The Court concluded that Congress could not have intended the states "to
have broader power than federal agencies to exempt private conduct from the antitrust
laws." (footnotes omitted). Id. at 596.
27. Id. at 595-96. Since neither the Michigan legislature nor the Public Service
Commission had investigated the desirability of the light bulb program or calculated
its competitive effect, the Supreme Court reasoned that the state had not adopted a
public policy of supplanting competition in the light bulb market. Id. at 593-94. See
id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
28. The Court does not indicate the type of fact situation in which it would be proper
to imply an exemption from the antitrust laws. The one situation alluded to in the opinion as possibly qualifying for an exemption is one "in which the State's participation
in a decision is so dominant that it would be unfair to hold a private party responsible
for his conduct in implementing it .... ." Id. at 594-95.
29. Id. at 597, quoting Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,
391 (1973) (Federal Power Act does not insulate power company from antitrust laws).
See also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963) (Bank Merger Act of 1960 does not immunize approved mergers from antitrust laws); United States
v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 197-206 (1939) (Agriculture Marketing Act of 1937 does
not bar application of Sherman Act to competitive agreements not authorized by Secretary of Agriculture).
30. 428 U.S. at 582 n.4.
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Only a plurality of the Court adopted Justice Stevens' view that the state
action defense exempts only the state, its officials, and its agents from Sherman Act liability. The separate concurring opinions of Chief Justice
Burger 1 and Justice Blackmun3 2 argued that the exemption should be predicated on the nature of the challenged activity, and not upon the identity of
the parties sued. Justice Blackmun also disavowed the majority's application
of the federal exemption standard to Detroit Edison's defense, opting instead
for a rule of reason approach in which the Sherman Act would preempt statesanctioned anticompetitive activities where the interference with competition
outweighs the potential benefits of the scheme.a3
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell -and Rehnquist, dissented, arguing
that Congress never intended the Sherman Act to apply to economic areas
subject to state regulation.3 4 The dissent attacked the Court's adoption of
the federal exemption standard as a judicial usurpation of state legislative
prerogatives. Justice Stewart argued that this standard, by allowing the judiciary to reach an independent determination of the "necessity" of a particular
regulatory provision, enables the judiciary to make ad hoc evaluations of the
substantive validity of state regulatory goals.3 5 The judiciary, concluded
Justice Stewart, is barred from making such determinations by the Court's
rejection of the substantive due process doctrine.3 6
31. Id. at 603 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
32. Id. at 605 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 610-11. See Slater, supra note 3, in which the author advocates the type
of balancing test adopted in Justice Blackmun's opinion. See also notes 80-91 infra
& accompanying text infra.
34. 428 U.S. at 614-40 (Stewart, J., with Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
This view is based on an analysis of the legislative debate that accompanied the passage
of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., H.R. No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., (1890); 21 CoNG.
REc. 2467 (1890) (Remarks of Sen. Hiscock); id. at 2469-70 (remarks of Sen. Reagen);
20 CONG. REC. 1458 (remarks of Sen. George). But see notes 81-86 & accompanying
text infra.
35. 428 U.S. at 627.
36. Id. The substantive due process doctrine was based on the view that the courts
may employ the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to strike down laws
which are thought to be unreasonable. See, e.g., Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264
U.S. 504 (1924) (fixing the weight of loaves of bread); Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U.S. 525 (1923) (setting minimum wages for women); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905) (outlawing "yellow dog" contracts). This doctrine was rejected in the
Court's 1934 decision in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), where in upholding
a New York statute establishing price controls for the milk industry, the Court wrote,
"a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adopted to its purpose."
Id. at 537. See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-730 (1963) (upholding
Kansas statute prohibiting non-lawyers from engaging in business of debt adjusting);
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 226 (1941) (upholding Nebraska statute limiting maximum
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I.

THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION:
OF THE

DEVELOPMENT

Parker DOCTRINE

The state action exemption received its first explicit recognition in the
Court's 1943 decision in Parker v. Brown.87 In Parker, a producer and
packer of raisins brought an action against the California Director of Agriculture and other state officials responsible for administering the California
Agricultural Prorate Act.88 The Act established an advisory commission
which, upon application by ten affected producers, would establish production limits and price controls for specific geographical areas.8 9 The controls became effective only after approval by 65 percent of the growers in
the affected zone owning 50 percent of the acreage devoted to production of
the regulated crop. 40 The district court upheld Parker's claim that the program interfered with interstate commerce and was preempted by the federal
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 41 and granted injunctive relief. 42 On
direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties were directed to also argue
the question of the program's validity under the Sherman Act. 48 In its discussion of the antitrust issue, the Court assumed that the program would violate the Sherman Act if organized and directed by private persons but held
the Sherman Act inapplicable to restraints imposed by the state as sovereign. 44 The Court noted that the Act contains no mention of the state and
allowable fee of private employment agencies); United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding federal statute prohibiting interstate shipment of adulterated milk).
37. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Although Parker v. Brown is usually cited as the case that
first recognized the state action exemption and is the center of the Court's attention in
Cantor, the principle discussed in Cantor can be traced to two earlier cases: Lowenstein
v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (D.S.C. 1895), and Olsen. v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904). In
Lowenstein, the circuit court rejected a North Carolina liquor merchant's Sherman Act
challenge of a South Carolina statute creating a state monopoly in spirits. The court
held the Sherman Act applicable only to privately created monopolies. In Olsen, the
Supreme Court upheld a Texas statute which limited the pilotage business to licensed

pilots, stating, "(N]o monopoly or combination in a legal sense can arise from the fact
that the duly authorized agents of the state .
'perform the duties devolving upon them
by law.'" 195 U.S. at 345.
38. Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, 1933 Cal. Stat. 1969, as amended by ch. 471, 743,
1935 Cal. Stat. 1530, 2088; ch. 6, 1938 Cal. Stat. Extra Sess. 39; ch. 894, 1939 Cal. Stat.
2485; chs. 1150, 1186, 1941 Cal. Stat. 2858, 2943 (codified in CAL. AGRUc.

CODE

§

59641 (West 1968)).
39. 317 U.S. at 346-47.
40. Id.
41. 7 U.S.C. § 601 et. seq (1970).
42. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895, 902 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
43. Supreme Court Journal, October Term 1941, at 252.
44. 317 U.S. at 350-52. The Court also upheld the California program against the
preemption and commerce clause challenges, finding the state scheme compatible with
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was viewed by its sponsor as prohibiting only private business combinations. 45
Although the organization of the prorate zone involved a mixture of private
and state action, the Court concluded that the state's role in adopting and
enforcing the program through the commission was sufficient to place the program beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. 46 The one qualification placed
on the seemingly open-ended antitrust exemption granted in Parker was the
Court's statement that a state may not immunize private parties from the operation of the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it or by declaring
their action lawful. 47 This limitation, however, was apparently intended by
the Court to apply only where the state is not acting to further an affirmative
regulatory scheme. 48 Thus, in Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers
Corp.,49 the Supreme Court cited Parker'sstatement that a state may not compel private conduct forbidden by the Sherman Act, in invalidating a Louisiana statute that permitted resale price maintenance contracts to be binding
on nonsigners. 50 Since the Louisiana statute was clearly not enacted to further a state regulatory scheme but rather sought to exempt private citizens
from the antitrust laws, the exemption was found to be inapplicable.
The Parker doctrine was again reviewed by the Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Association. 1 Goldfarb set out the exemption's threshold
52
requirement that the state action be required by the state acting as sovereign.

In reviewing the question of price fixing by lawyers, the Court rejected the
claim of respondent state and county bar associations that their enforcement
of minimum fee schedules had been prompted by the Virginia Supreme
Court's adoption of ethical codes authorizing the issuance of such schedules.
In the Court's view, the Virginia Supreme Court's direction to lawyers not to
the federal statute and the regulated area a proper subject of state concern which did
not interfere with interstate commerce. Id. at 350-68.
45. Id. at 351. See also 21 CONG. REC. 2562, 2457 (1890) (remarks of Senator
Sherman).
46. 317 U.S. at 352.
47. Id. at 351, citing Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332,
344-47 (1904).
48. Where the state is acting to further an affirmative regulatory scheme, the exemption apparently applies however spurious the nature of the state interest involved
or however harmful the effect of the -provision on competition. See Slater, supra, note
3. at 91; Handler, supra note 4, at 12.
49. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
50. Id. at 389, Schwegmann was legislatively overruled by the McGuire Act which
upheld the validity of non-signer clauses. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970). The McGuire
Act was subsequently repealed by the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L.
94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1976).
51. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
52. Id. at 790, citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
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be controlled by fee schedules indicated that the State of Virginia did not require respondents' anticompetitive conduct. 3 The fact that respondents' enforcement of mandatory minimum fees may have been prompted by the
Virginia Supreme Court's issuance of the ethical codes was deemed insufficient
to confer the antitrust law exemption.1 4 The Goldfarb Court did not indicate
whether the state action exemption would have been applied had the State,
however, required the bar association's enforcement of minimum fee schedules. Far from clarifying the ultimate parameters of the state action exemption, the Court's finding that respondents' activities were not required by the
state amounted merely to a determination that the state had not acted. The
Goldfarb Court thus did not confront the question of whether the Sherman
Act must bow to inconsistent state regulation.
Many of the lower federal courts that have declined to apply the state
action exemption to the activities of private parties have also failed to confront the question of whether the Sherman Act preempts inconsistent state
regulation. In developing various tests for determining the existence of antitrust law immunities, the courts have instead focused on aspects of the challenged scheme that indicate whether the state authorized the private parties'
anticompetitive activities. Thus in Marnell v. United Parcel Service of
America, Inc., 55 the District Court for the Northern District of California rejected the state action defense claim of a regulated trucking company sued
for monopolization. Although the trucking company was subject to state
regulation, the court concluded that the exemption was inapplicable since the
regulatory scheme was "one of general supervision rather than one of specific
direction." 56

53. 421 U.S. at 788-90. Although the state bar association was a state agency for
the purpose of regulating the legal profession in Virginia, the Court rejected the view
that this status would be employed to "create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster
anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members." Id. at 791 (footnote omitted).
The Court concluded that the state bar's enforcement of the county bar's minimum fee
schedules through the threat of potential disciplinary actions for noncomplying attorneys
was "essentially a private anticompetitive activity." Id. at 790-91.
54. Id. at 791.
55. 260 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
56. Id. at 409. See also Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (Congress did not intend to put activities of D.C.
armory board beyond reach of antitrust laws); Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade v. FTC,
263 F.2d 502, 508 (4th Cir. 1959) (activities of state created tobacco board the result
of individual and not state action). But see the following cases where courts immunized
privately initiated and enforced anticompetitive schemes: Washington Gas Light Co. v.
Virginia Electric Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971) (state action found in regulatory agency's failure to disapprove of utility's tying arrangement); Fleming v. Traveler's
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A similar result was reached by the Western District of Pennsylvania in
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross,57 where the court refused to apply
the state action exemption to defendant's alleged restraint and monopolization of the hospital insurance business. Although Blue Cross was regulated
and supervised by Pennsylvania's Insurance Department, the court deemed
the state action exemption inapplicable since the legislature had not directed
either the Insurance Department or Blue Cross to employ anticompetitive
practices to achieve a governmental purpose.5 8 This ruling comports with
the results reached by other courts which have held that the state action exemption applies only where the state had determined that competition was
not desirable in a particular field and substituted an alternate form of public
regulation. 59
Several lower courts, however, have broadly applied the state action exemption to immunize private conduct that arguably was never specifically
considered by the state body regulating the challenged party. These courts
have applied the Sherman Act exemption where the final authority to approve or disapprove the private parties' conduct was lodged in a state officer
or agent. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lanier,0o the Fourth Circuit immunized a privately initiated scheme in which insurance companies formed a
rating board to set uniform rates throughout North Carolina. The court's
holding rested solely on the fact that the rates were not effective until approved by the State Commissioner of Insurance. 61
The Fourth Circuit considerably broadened the exemption created in Allstate in Washington Gaslight Co. v. Virginia Electric and Power Co.62 In
this case, plaintiff gas company challenged as unlawful a tying arrangement
Indemnity Co., 324 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Mass. 1971) (general scheme of insurance companies, rate-fixing conduct prescribed and effectuated by the state); Wainwright v. National Dairy Products Corp., 304 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (state action found in
actions of Georgia Milk Commission); Miley v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 148

F. Supp. 299 (D. Mass.), aff'd mer. 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
828 (1951) (state action found in pervasive regulatory scheme applicable to insurance
industry).
57.
58.

298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
Id. at 1111-12.

59. See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (state did not intend subversion of competitive bidding process for municipal building contracts); Traveler's Insurance Co. v.
Blue Cross, 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969) (legislature had not directed defendant
to employ anticompetitive practices).
60. 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
61.

Id. at 873.

See also Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140

(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972), rehearing denied, 405 U.S. 969
(1972).
62. 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
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in which Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) waived underground installation charges for builders installing electrical appliances which
were designed to use certain quantities of electricity.68 Although the plan
had not been approved by the state utility commission, the court concluded
that the failure of the state regulatory agency to approve or disapprove of
the defendant's anticompetitive activities as insufficient to deprive it of Sherman Act immunity. The court reasoned that, since the state agency possessed the power to prohibit VEPCO's promotional plan, its administrative silence implied consent to that plan. 64 The ruling represents the high water
mark of judicial solicitude for state prerogatives that underlies the state action
exemption and illustrates the extent to which Parker enabled private parties
to shield their anticompetitive behavior from the penalties of the antitrust
laws through the simple expedient of cloaking them in a state action garb.
II.

Cantor: SETTING THE PROPER BOUNDARIES OF THE
STATE ACTION EXEMPTION?

The Cantor ruling greatly limits the antitrust immunity of regulated parties by indicating that the mere presence of state regulation is insufficient to
confer antitrust immunity upon the private parties' conduct.6 5 By predicating
the existence of antitrust immunity on whether the immunity is necessary to
make the regulatory act work, and applying the exemption to the minimum
extent necessary to effect its policies, the Court's new test portends a significant limitation on state regulatory prerogatives. Since a determination of
the "necessity" of a particular regulatory provision necessarily involves judicial inquiry into the substantive validity of state regulatory goals, the Court's
new test is subject to attack as a resurrection of the long-rejected doctrine
of substantive due process.6 6 Thus, while the Cantor Court correctly perceived the necessity of limiting the potentially open-ended immunity created
by Parker,its test fails to adequately acknowledge or assess the origins of the
state action exemption in the principles of federalism.
Similarly, the plurality's limitation of Parker to an exemption for the
actions of only the state and its officers does not logically follow from the
language employed in that decision. While not without precedent, 67 this view
63. Id. at 249-50.
64. Id. at 252.
65. 428 U.S. at 596.
66. See note 36 supra.
67. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 298 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 (W.D. Pa. 1969),

where, in holding the anticompetitive activities of a regulated non-profit hospital plan
corporation subject to the antitrust laws, the court stated, "Blue Cross fails to meet the
apparent standards inherent in a 'state action' exclusion from the scope of the Sherman
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of Parker misreads the basic issue in that case, which was whether the restraint of trade accomplished through the California program was exempt
from the Sherman Act.0 8 It is doubtful that the Parker court contemplated a
plaintiff being able to circumvent its decision, interfere with a state's program,
and subject a private party to possible treble damages, simply by naming a
private party as defendant., 9 The analytical inadequacy of the plurality opinion is illustrated by the fact that it derives its interpretation of Parker
not so much from the language of the Court, as from the briefs filed in that
case. 70 It is only by employing the briefs as a "legislative history" of the
case 7 ' that the plurality could logically limit the Parker holding as it did.
The plurality's view of the scope of the state action exemption amounts to
a sub silentio overruling of Parker. The plurality's restrictive view of Parker
is not only questionable as an analytical matter, but is simply unnecessary
to the resolution of the state action problem in Cantor. Parker can be viewed
as involving no question of the subordination of federal to state interests since
the federal statute7 2 governing agricultural policy envisioned the development
of concurrent state programs. 73 In the California program challenged in
Parker, the Secretary of Agriculture had made loans to the prorate plan under
a federal statute -authorizing loans for the accomplishment of federal agricultural policies.74 The Parker immunity can therefore be viewed as flowing
not from the state's action in implementing the prorate program, but rather
from the actions of the federal government.7 5 Since the Supreme Court will
imply exemptions from the antitrust laws to the extent necessary to effect the
purposes of federal legislation, 76 the Parker Court could have upheld the
California program without reaching the question of federal antitrust policy.
Act in two respects. It is the creature of individuals-not the state-and it has not been
extended valid governmental authority to engage in monopolistic practices."
68. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
69. See Comment, Antitrust Immunity-Reevaluation & Synthesis of Parker v.
Brown-Intent, State Action, Causation, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1245, 1262 (1973).
70. 428 U.S. at 617 (Stewart, J.,with Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). As
the dissenters note, "The conflicting views presented in the adversarial briefs and argu-

ments submitted to this Court do not bear an analogous relationship to the Court's final
product." Id. at 618.
71. Id.

72. Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1970).
73. See 317 U.S. at 358.
74. Id. at 356.
75. See Slater, supra note 3, at 85-88. See also Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law v.
Anticompetitive State Regulation, 39 A.B.A. ANTITRUsT L.J. 950, 960-91 (1970).
76. See Slater, supra note 3, at 87. See, e.g., Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422

U.S. 659, 682 (1975); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)
ing general rule in dicta).

(stat-
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Similarly, by focusing on the prorate program's effectuation of federal policy,
the Cantor plurality could have avoided the analytical pitfalls of its limitation
of Parker to suits against state officials and reaffirmed the basic legitimacy
of state efforts to regulate matters of local concern.
The substantive due process ramifications of the Cantor majority's application of the federal exemptions standard could also have been avoided if
the majority had directly confronted the question of the Sherman Act's preemptive effect on inconsistent state regulation. The majority's statement
that "[clongress could hardly have intended state regulatory agencies to have
broader power than federal agencies to exempt private conduct from the
antitrust laws" 7 fails to recognize that while federal exemptions are based
solely on statutory construction, 78 the state action exemption is premised on
the view that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to apply to restraints
of trade imposed by the states acting in their sovereign capacities. 7 9 The
concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun recognizes the deficiencies inherent
in both the plurality and majority views of the state action exemption and
articulates a rule of reason balancing test approach to state action problems. Under Justice Blackmun's approach, state-sanctioned anticompetitive
activity would be subject to the prohibitions of the Sherman Act where the
80
potential harms of the scheme outweigh its benefits.
Justice Blackmun notes that while the legislative history of the Sherman
Act reflects the view that state regulation was exempted from the Act, 81 this
view is indicative only of the narrow construction then given to Congress'
power to regulate under the commerce clause. 82 At the time of the Sherman
Act's passage, manufacturing was not considered part of interstate commerce 83 and Congress' power to regulate under the commerce clause had been
limited to interstate buying, selling, and transportation. 84 The Supreme
Court subsequently rejected this narrow view of the commerce clause by
holding, in a long series of cases, that purely intrastate actions could be regulated under the commerce clause if they had the requisite effect on interstate
77. 428 U.S. at 596.
78. The question for the Court is simply one of resolving whether the federal regulatory provision is inconsistent with the Sherman Act, since Congress clearly possesses
the power to amend or repeal the provisions of the antitrust laws. See cases cited note
29 supra.
79. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
80. 428 U.S. at 610 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
81. See sources cited note 34 supra.
82. 428 U.S. at 605 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
83. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Kidd v. Pearson, 128
U.S. 1 (1888).
84. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20 (1888).
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commerce.8 5 The Court has incorporated this expanded concept of the commerce clause into its view of the Sherman Act's reach by ruling that Congress
intended the Sherman Act to expand along the lines of the commerce
clause." 6
The preemption test advocated by Justice Blackmun8 7 attempts to balance
the competing federal and state interests by applying the antitrust exemption
only where the state can demonstrate that its regulatory scheme is enacted
on the plausible ground of improving health, safety, market performance, or
resource allocation."" In short, the state's interest in regulation is preserved
in those areas where it has substituted itself for the forces of competition to
achieve a permissible state regulatory goal.89 This test would immunize the
prorate program challenged in Parker, since dangerously fluctuating agricultural prices are a valid subject for state regulation.9" The light bulb program
involved in Cantor, however, would be denied the exemption in the absence
of a showing by Detroit Edison that a particular state interest outweighed the
program's anticompetitive impact. 91 While Justice Blackmun's rule of reason -approach circumscribes the regulatory powers of the states, it avoids
the substantive due process ramifications of the majority's approach by avoiding any inquiry into the "necessity" of a particular state provision. The
focus, rather, is purely on whether the state interest served by the regulatory
scheme justifies the subordination of the federal government's interest in
92
antitrust enforcement.
85. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219 (1948); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939); Railroad Comm'n of Wisconsin
v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922).
86. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 96 S. Ct. 1848, 1852
(1976); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945).
87. 428 U.S. at 610-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
88. Id.
89. See id. at 611.
90. Id. at 613 n.5.
91. See id. at 613-14. Justice Blackmun also recognizes the possibility of a fairness
defense based on the fact that Detroit Edison's breach of its tariff would result in a violation of Michigan Law. Id. at 614 n.6.
92. One additional objection of the dissenters meriting discussion is Justice Stewart's
view that under the holding in Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), no liability can attach to the utility's acts in proposing the tariff. Noerr held that antitrust immunity can be predicated on the activities of
businesses lobbying before public officials for legislation that would have anticompetitive
effects. The Noerr Court stated that the application of the Sherman Act to these measures would inteifere with the first amendment right to petition the government and would
undermine the democratic processes of representative government by depriving citizens
of the essential right of communicating with public officials. See also UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). The dissent follows this line of argument by stating that
the utility's acts in complying with the tariff are also exempt from antitrust law enforce-
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III.

CONCLUSION

The Cantor decision drastically curtails the states' power to insulate private anticompetitive conduct from the antitrust laws. While the Court is
sharply divided on the means by which the state action exemption is to be
narrowed, a clear majority favors confining the exemption to those instances
where it is necessary to effectuate an overriding state interest. Since Cantor
concerns a trade restraint that was clearly tangential to the state's interest
in utility regulation, the ultimate impact of the case is difficult to assess. It
is doubtful that the Court intends the decision to apply to pervasive state regulatory schemes, but the majority's failure to immunize state programs manifesting a legitimate legislative policy of replacing competition with regulation
casts an ominous pall over the states' ability to regulate. This pall would
be eliminated by the majority's adoption of Justice Blackmun's approach,
which preserves the states' interest in legitimate regulation, while lessening
the possibility that a court would exempt from the antitrust laws private conduct that is merely clothed as state action. The Blackmun approach would
establish a rule that is consistent both with the federal antitrust laws and the
solicitude for state regulatory prerogatives that underlies the state action exemption.

Stephen C. Skubel

ment under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
428 U.S. at 624 (Stewart, J., with Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.,
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
dissenting).
It should be noted that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is based on constitutional bases
of protecting free speech and representative democracy, while Parker concerned only
Congress' intent in passing the Sherman Act. See Handler, supra note 4 at 10-12;
Slater, supra note 3, at 74 n.13. As the commentators note, Parker and Noerr-Pennington problems often arise in the same case since the plaintiff will attack both the state
action and the defendant's activities in securing that action. See, e.g., Hecht v. ProFootball, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972);
Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock
Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
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ATTORNEYS-Court-Appointed Attorneys Who Represent
Indigent Defendants Enjoy Absolute Immunity in the Performance of Their Duties from Damage Suits Brought Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976).
An individual who has been deprived of a specific constitutional right
under color of state law may sue the person who deprived him of that right
under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 for equitable relief or monetary damages. Read
literally, section 1983 imposes liability without requiring proof of the defendant's motive or the unreasonableness of his actions, and without regard to
the scope of his discretion when acting in his official capacity. Courts, however, have declined to give the language of the section its literal meaning.
Instead, they have recognized both absolute and qualified immunity from
liability under the section, 2 based on the status of the individual defendant.
Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Minns v. Paul,3 became
the second federal circuit to hold that court-appointed attorneys are absolutely immune from section 1983 liability in suits which are brought by their
4
former clients.
In Minns, an inmate of a Virginia prison alleged that his court-appointed
attorney5 had failed to honor his request to file a petition for habeas corpus
without communicating the reasons for his inaction. Thirty-seven days after
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2. E.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute immunity from section
1983 liability for state prosecutors); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (qualified
immunity from section 1983 liability for local school board members); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (qualified immunity from section 1983 liability for state
executive officers); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (absolute immunity for state
court judges; qualified immunity for local police officers); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367 (1951) (absolute immunity for state legislators).
3. 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976).
4. The first case in which a United States court of appeals found a court-appointed
attorney absolutely immune from liability under section 1983 was Brown v. Joseph, 463
F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973). A qualified immunity
for public defenders was found in John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973). See
notes 39-43 & accompanying text infra.
5. The appointment was pursuant to VA. CODE § 53-21.2 (1974), which provides:
The judge of a court of record having jurisdiction in the trial of criminal offenses . . . shall on motion of the Commonwealth's Attorney for such county
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his initial request had been made, Minns brought suit against the attorney
under section 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. He sought a declaratory judgment, $200 in compensatory
damages, and $50 in punitive damages, alleging that the attorney's failure
to assist him had deprived him of his liberty without due process of law. The
district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the attorney had not acted under color of state law. 6
The Fourth Circuit, although affirming the district court's dismissal, assumed that the attorney had acted under color of state law so as to satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement of section 1983. However, the circuit court
stated that court-appointed attorneys should be absolutely immune from section 1983 liability for acts performed within the scope of their court appointment.7 Noting that the Supreme Court has recognized the existence of immunity from section 1983 liability for state officials within the judicial
process, the Fourth Circuit held that the same considerations of policy that
entitle state officials to immunity should be extended to court-appointed attorneys. According to the court's analysis, those considerations include not
only the need to protect the court-appointed attorney's "free exercise of professional discretion," but the need to recruit and keep able lawyers to represent indigents. To further both objectives, the court stated, the courtappointed attorney must be insulated from liability for failing to press the
"frivolous" claims that indigent clients often bring. Without absolute immunity, the court reasoned, the attorney would not be free to exercise his best
judgment, for he would have to weigh each decision against the possibility
that a dissatisfied client could later force him to spend time and energy on
his own defense that otherwise could be devoted to the meritorious claims
of other indigents. 8
Moreover, the court noted that the indigent client is not left remediless
by being deprived of a cause of action against his attorney under section
1983. Other forms of relief cited by the court include the indigent's right
to seek post-conviction relief through direct appeal or habeas corpus petition,
or city, when he is requested so to do by [a prison superintendent] . . . , appoint one or more discreet and competent attorneys-at-law to counsel and assist
indigent inmates therein confined regarding any legal matter relating to their
incarceration, other than that pending in any court and for which an attorneyat-law has been appointed by the court or otherwise obtained by an inmate.
An attorney so appointed shall be paid as directed by the court from the
criminal fund, reasonable compensation on an hourly basis and necessary expenses, based upon monthly reports to be furnished the court by him.
6. 542 F.2d at 900.
7. Id.

8. Id. at 901-02.
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to act as his own counsel, or to file a grievance against the attorney with his
state bar association.9 Significantly, the court also stated that by assuming
that the court-appointed attorney acts under color of state law, its decision
preserves the public right to prosecute the court-appointed attorney who willfully abuses his position to deprive his client of his constitutional rights under
18 U.S.C. § 242,10 section 1983's criminal counterpart.

I.

FEDERAL RIGHTS FOR STATE WRONGS

Section 1983, like section 242, originated in the Civil Rights Act of 1871,11
the basic purpose of which was to provide a federal remedy for the crimes
which were perpetrated against blacks in the Southern States during Reconstruction. 12 When the Act was passed, its civil damages section was considered relatively innocuous as compared to the criminal penalty. 1 3 More recently, however, section 1983 has been increasingly utilized instead of section
242, because it affords a private civil remedy for the victim of a constitutional
deprivation without requiring him to prove the defendant's ill will or specific
intent. 14 Furthermore, while section 1983 was originally enacted to provide
9. Id. at 902. After this casenote was written, the Virginia Bar Association publicly reprimanded an attorney for his "unwarranted delay" in filing the habeas corpus
petition of a paying client, which caused the client to spend an extra four months in
prison. See Wash. Post, Mar. 6, 1977, § B, at 1, col. 1.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970) provides:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains,
or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of
his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both;
and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years
or for life.
11. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, §§ 1, 2, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
12. See S. REP. No. 1, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (1872); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d
Sess., App. 372-81 (1872) (speech of Sen. F.P. Blair); Id. at 471-84 (speech of the
Hon. John Coburn) (There was no debate on this portion of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 when it was passed by Congress. The remarks previously cited in this footnote
were made early in the congressional session that immediately followed passage of the
Act.). See generally Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on
State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331 (1967); Shapo,
Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277
(1965).

See also J. RANDALL & D.

DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

682-85 (2d ed. rev. 1969).
13. Cf. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 475-77 (1872).
14. Compare Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (rejection of specific intent
as requisite for claim under section 1983) with Kennedy v. Anderson, 373 F. Supp.
1345 (E.D. Okla. 1974) (charge under section 242 may only be initiated by federal
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federal redress for blacks, it has subsequently been used to provide a remedy
for acts that are not racially motivated. 15
Although section 1983 has often been utilized to provide injunctive and
declaratory relief, the Supreme Court first considered the boundaries of its
jurisdiction and the scope of its liability with respect to a suit for monetary
damages in Monroe v. Pape.'6 There the Supreme Court found that a valid
section 1983 claim had been asserted against a group of Chicago police officers who had broken into the plaintiff's home at night without a warrant, subjected him and his family to assaultive conduct and personal indignities, and
detained him incommunicado on open charges for ten hours without arresting
him or bringing him before a magistrate.' 7 The Court held that since one
purpose of section 1983 was to provide a right in federal court for the state's
failure to enforce its own laws or to honor the constitutional rights of its citizens, 18 the police officers had acted under color of state law when they had
exceeded and abused the authority which had been given them. The Court
expressly rejected the notion that "willfulness" or specific intent to deprive
an individual of his constitutional rights need be established for section 1983
liability, concluding instead that the section "should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions."' 19
The sweeping concluding language in Monroe left courts in a quandary
as to how section 1983 liability was to be measured. Subsequent cases have
tended to limit liability under the section, either by finding that the particular
grand jury or U.S. attorney) and Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945)
(specific intent required under section 242). Also, prosecution under section 242 is
limited to instances in which discrimination occurred because of race, color or alienage.
See note 10 supra.
15. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (violation of due process
rights of public school students who possessed alcoholic beverages); Egan v. City of
Aurora, 365 U.S. 514 (1961) (violation of mayor's rights of free speech and assembly);
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (violation of civil rights of union members); Fisher
v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973) (wrongful termination of employment on
basis of interference of social misbehavior); Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d
Cir. 1966) (discrimination against member of ethnic minority on ground of racial bias);
Herschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 973 (1966) (denial of
freedom of expression through unlawful detention); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605
(5th Cir. 1964) (discrimination in granting of municipal licenses); Cohen v. Norris, 300
F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962) (violation of white citizen's civil rights due to false arrest and
imprisonment); Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959) (wrongful incarceration in mental hospital); Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945)
(violation of civil rights of white fugitives charged with flag desecration).
16. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
17. Id. at 169.
18. Id. at 180.

19. id. at 187. However, inAdickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 171-74
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defendant did not act under color of state law 2 ° or by granting him immunity
from liability when this jurisdictional requirement has been satisfied. Addi-

tionally, courts have differentiated between a grant of qualified immunity,
in which a particular defendant may be liable only for his negligent acts, and
absolute immunity, which extends to all acts performed within the scope of
the individual's actual or apparent authority. Particularly within the criminal
justice system, judicially imposed jurisdictional requirements and grants of
immunity have severely limited the liability of defendants in section 1983
actions since Monroe was decided.
II.

ARE ATTORNEYS LIABLE FOR THEIR "CONSTITUTIONAL

TORTS"?

Four classes of persons occupy prominent positions within the criminal
justice system: judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and law enforcement
officers. It has been firmly established that persons who possess actual official authority, whether elective or appointive, and persons who misuse their
apparent authority act "under color of law" for section 1983 purposes. 21

Thus, judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers all occupy positions
which place them within the jurisdictional bounds of section 1983. By contrast, defense attorneys arguably do not act under color of law and therefore
are not covered by section 1983. Although all attorneys are "officers of the
court," attorneys who participate in private state court litigation are not, without more, state functionaries for purposes of section 1983.22 When the attor(1970), the Court found it essential that a defendant in a section 1983 action have
acted with the knowledge of and pursuant to state statute or custom.
20. Language in Monroe supports the interpretation that the under-color-of-state-law
requirement in section 1983 is coextensive with the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. 365 U.S. at 171. But the Supreme Court has stated in both Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) and Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163, 176 (1972), that state action is predicated upon finding a "sufficiently close
nexus" between the state and the wrong which is alleged in order to attribute the wrong
to the state itself. The absence of such a nexus will defeat federal jurisdiction under
section 1983. See, e.g., Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Cody v. Union Elec., 518 F.2d 978
(8th Cir. 1975).
21. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183-87 (1961). Cf. Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91, 108-13 (1945).
22. Steward v. Meeker, 459 F.2d 669, 670 (3d Cir. 1972) (private attorney is an
officer of the court, but because his absolute duty is owed to his client, he does not
act under color of law for section 1983 purposes); Kovacs v. Goodman, 383 F. Supp.
507 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (lawyers who participate in trial of private state court litigation
are not state functionaries acting under color of law for purposes of section 1983).
See Jones v. Jones, 410 F.2d. 365 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1969); Skolnick v. Spolar, 317 F.2d 857 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 904 (1963); Skolnick
v. Martin, 317 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1963). See generally Gozansky & Kertz, Private
Lawyers' Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 24 EMORY L.J. 959 (1975).
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ney is appointed by the court itself, however, and his salary is paid out of
public funds, a closer connection exists between the attorney's activities and
the state. 23 Nevertheless, federal courts have often held that this connection
alone cannot be parlayed into an actionable claim-against the court-appointed
attorney under section 1983.24
The view that court-appointed attorneys do not act under color of law for
purposes of establishing federal jurisdiction under section 1983 has been accepted by the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, and was the rule in the Third
Circuit until 1972.25 Courts that have adopted this view have reasoned that
while the attorney may receive his appointment and remuneration from the
state, his duties upon appointment are essentially those of the privately retained counsel. The standard for the adequacy of the attorney's legal services is the same whether he represents an indigent or a paying client-"the
exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the
'2 6
time and place."
In United States ex rel. Wood v. Blacker,2 7 the New Jersey district court
stated that the activities of a public defender did not constitute state action,
because the attorney was not the state's representative and the state did not
control his defense of the assigned client. Moreover, the state act which had
created the public defender service had not given the public defender any
authority which he did not already possess by virtue of his license to practice
law. 28 Thus, the nexus between the state's sponsorship of the public defendApp. 3d 269, 328 N.E.2d 195 (1975) (representa23. See People v. Majewski, 28 I11.
tion of indigents is a requirement of due process of law, and creation of the office
of public defender constitutes a delegation of sovereignty). But see State ex rel. Purkey
v. Ciolino, 393 F. Supp. 102, 107 (E.D. La. 1975) (private attorney appointed by state
without compensation does not act under color of state law).
24. While there is a conceptual difference between the court-appointed attorney and
the public defender in terms of state action (since the state creates the institution in
the latter instance but only makes the appointment in the former), only one court has
considered the distinction worth mentioning. Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046, 1048
(3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973). See Gozansky & Kertz, supra note
22, at 970-71.
25. E.g., Harkins v. Eldredge, 505 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1974); Espinoza v. Rogers,
470 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1972); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968);
Tasby v. Peek, 396 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Ark. 1975); Ehn v. Price, 372 F. Supp. 151
1974); United States ex rel. Wood v. Blacker, 335 F. Supp. 43 (D.N.J. 1971);
(N.D. I11.
Brown v. Duggan, 329 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Hamrick v. Norton, 322 F.
Supp. 424 (D. Kan. 1970), a! 'd, 436 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1971); Peake v. County
of Philadelphia, 280 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
26. Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970), quoting RESTATEMENT
Cf. Fletcher v. Hook, 446 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 299(a) (1965).
1971) (alleged attorney malpractice is not cognizable under section 1983).
27. 335 F. Supp. 43 (D.N.J. 1971).
28. Id. at 47. Accord, Harkins v, Eldredge, 505 F.2d 802, 803 (8th Cir. 1974);
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er system and the essentially discretionary activity of the public defend29
er was insufficient to attribute his alleged misconduct to the state.
By contrast, the circuits that have conferred immunity on court-appointed
attorneys"0 have relied heavily on cases that have granted immunity from section 1983 liability to both judges and public prosecutors. In Pierson v. Ray,"
the Supreme Court granted absolute immunity from section 1983 liability to
state court judges for acts performed within their "judicial role." The Court
acknowledged that section 1983 made no explicit reference to immunities,
but it found no congressional intent in the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act to abrogate the common law immunity of judges from liability in
the performance of their official acts. The Pierson Court also recognized
that judges perform many discretionary acts, and that the public interest
would be served by giving judges the "liberty to exercise their functions
with independence, and without fear of consequences. '3 2 Thus, judicial immunity from section 1983 liability extended even to malicious and corrupt
judicial acts, on the rationale that the immunity concept was designed to
protect the public's interest in the uninhibited exercise of judicial discretion
and was only secondarily a shield for the judge himself.33 Extending
absolute immunity from section 1983 liability to prosecutors in Imbler v.
Pachtman,3 4 the Supreme Court recently cited the need to insulate prosecutorial discretion and judgment from further judicial review. Anything less
than absolute immunity from liability, the Court stated, would divert prosecutors' energies and attention from enforcing the criminal law; moreover,
the substantial risk of incurring liability under section 1983 from frequent
damage suits would interfere with prosecutors' exercise of independent
5
judgment.3
Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d 1174, 1175 (10th Cir. 1972).
29. 335 F. Supp. at 47. See cases cited in note 25 supra.
30. See John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973); Brown v.Joseph, 463 F.2d
1046 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
31. 386 U.S.547 (1967).
32. Id. at 554, quoting Scott v.Stansfield, E.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1968).
33. Id., citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, note at 349-50 (1872).
34. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
35. Id. at 424-28. The Court also noted that prosecutors, like judges, had been immune from liability for their official acts at common law. Id. at 421-24. But cf.
Madison v. Purdy, 410 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1969) (prosecutor can be sued when acting
outside the scope of his jurisdiction).
In Johnson v. Crumlish, 224 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1963), a prosecutor was
denied section 1983 immunity where the claim of the accused was based on summary
imprisonment under an allegedly illegal bench warrant without a hearing. The holding
of this case, however, has apparently been limited to its peculiar facts. See Brown
v.Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973); Arensman
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The Third Circuit in Brown v. Joseph,3 6 like the district court in Wood,
recognized that the function of the state-paid attorney is essentially the same
as that of his privately retained counterpart, and the court conceded that it
would be difficult to perceive that the former had acted under color of law
when the latter did not. Yet the court extended immunity to public defenders because it believed the public policy implicit in granting such immunity
was to encourage the "free exercise of professional discretion in the discharge
of pretrial, trial, and post-trial obligations."'37 The grant of immunity to
such attorneys would encourage people to become public defenders and would
relieve them of the "intrinsic conflict" between protecting themselves and
representing their clients.88
The Brown court, in assuming that the public defender had acted under
color of law, appeared to be more concerned with formulating a general rule
regarding attorneys' liability under section 1983 than with debating the
threshold issue of federal jurisdiction. However, the Seventh Circuit, which
granted qualified immunity to public defenders in John v. Hurt,8 9 stated that
"[i]t is at least arguable that a public defender acts under color of state
law." 40 The John court cited Brown as precedent but did not differentiate
between the scope of qualified, as opposed to absolute, immunity. However,
two subsequent Supreme Court cases, one concerning local school board
members 1 and the other state executive officials, 42 have clarified the
meaning of qualified immunity from section 1983 liability. Qualified immunity varies with the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the particular
officer against whom liability is sought, and with the circumstances under
which the particular action occurred. It is not available to an official who
either acts maliciously toward a particular individual or who negligently disregards an individual's legal rights in a particular circumstance. 43
Although the distinction between the cases which have found courtappointed attorneys immune under section 1983 and those which have found
them to be acting outside the federal court's jurisdiction initially may seem
minor, the difference may be substantial when a United States attorney attempts to prosecute a court-appointed attorney under section 242 of the
v. Brown, 430 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1970); Kovacs v. Goodman, 38-3 F. Supp. 507 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), afj'd, 515 F.2d 507 (1975).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
463 F.2d at 1048.
Id. at 1049.
489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 787.

41. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
42. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).

43. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
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criminal code, because the attorney must have acted under color of state law
to come within the jurisdiction of the federal court under that section. 44
Therefore, a finding that the attorney had not acted under color of law would
not only exempt him from liability under section 1983, but would deprive
the public of a right to prosecute him under section 242. In United States
v. Senak, 45 the only federal circuit court that has considered this issue concluded that the Government should be given the opportunity to try to establish that the defendant attorney acted under color of law. Senak involved
the federal prosecution of a public defender who allegedly had extorted
money from his indigent clients and their relatives, threatening to provide inadequate representation unless the extra sums were paid. 46 Citing Brown,
the attorney contended that he had not acted under color of law, but the court
found Brown inapposite. Not only did the court consider Brown's parallels
between the functions of the publicly appointed and privately retained attorney to be dicta, but it also recognized that the policy underlying the grant
of immunity was to protect public defenders "for acts done in the performance of [their] judicial function[s] . . . .
The court found that since
Senak's alleged extortion lay outside the scope of his duty as a public defender, he was not immune from public prosecution. 4s
"4

III.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE COURT-APPOINTED
ATTORNEY'S IMMUNITY

Paul49

In Minns v.
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit assumed
that the attorney had acted under color of state law so as to satisfy section
1983's jurisdictional requirement, but the court chose to extend immunity
to court-appointed attorneys.5 0 While the court recognized that both judicial
and prosecutorial immunity under section 1983 have their basis in the
common law, it reasoned that many of the same considerations of public
immunity in John was virtually indistinguishable from the "absolute" grant of immunity
in Brown. One district court in the Seventh Circuit subsequently has seemed to adopt
the Wood approach, thus rejecting the immunity concept of lohn. See Ehn v. Price,
372 F. Supp. 151, 153 (N.D. I11. 1974) (attorney's appointment as counsel does not
make him an officer of the state for purposes of section 1983).
44.
45.
46.
47.

See
477
Id.
Id.

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 185 (1961).
F.2d 304 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
at 305-07.
at 307, quoting 463 F.2d at 1048.

48. 477 F.2d at 307.

Senak was later tried and convicted for having deprived his

clients of their rights under color of law.

His conviction was upheld on appeal.

See

Senak v. United States, 527 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
49. 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976).
50. Id. at 900.
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policy which support immunity for judges and prosecutors also apply to
court-appointed attorneys, who, like judges and prosecutors, perform duties
that are essentially discretionary and therefore must be allowed to exercise
their judgment without having to weigh every decision in terms of potential
liability. 51 Like Brown and Wood, Minns acknowledged that the courtappointed attorney's primary responsibility is to represent his client, but
Minns emphasized, as had Brown, Imbler, and Pierson, both the significant
public interest in insulating particular participants within the judicial system
from section 1983 liability and the need to protect the free exercise of professional discretion-whether the discretion is being exercised by a judge, a
prosecutor, or an attorney.
This choice of absolute rather than qualified immunity assures courtappointed attorneys in the Fourth Circuit total freedom to exercise their discretion without having to defend beyond the pleading stage suits brought by
unsuccessful, resentful clients. Like Imbler, Minns declared that the grant of
merely qualified immunity would afford uncertain guidelines for the attorney's conduct. 52 The Minns court did not attempt to resolve its holding with
the qualified grant of immunity given by the Seventh Circuit in John, but
it noted that John was a pre-Imbler decision whose vitality was questionable. 53 Moreover, by its assumption that the court-appointed attorney acts
under color of law, the court in Minns preserved a public remedy against
the court-appointed attorney who abuses his office willfully to deprive a
client of his constitutional rights.5 4 If the court of appeals had simply
affirmed the district court's decision, no such public right of action would
exist under section 242.
On the other hand, the choice of absolute over qualified immunity leaves
no civil remedy under section 1983 for the indigent client and may in fact
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 901-02.
Id. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-28 (1976).
542 F.2d at 901 n.2. See note 43 supra.
Id. at 902. See notes 45-48 & accompanying text supra. In this respect, Minns

perhaps revitalized Senak, which other courts have limited to its own peculiar facts.
See John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786, 787-88 (7th Cir. 1973); Morrow v. Igleburger, 67
F.R.D. 675, 681-82 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
An alternate public remedy not mentioned in Minns but utilized recently by the
District of Columbia Circuit is appellate reversal of the lower court's conviction when
the defendant has been deprived effective assistance of counsel. See United States v.
DeCoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 19, 1976). Writing for the majority in DeCoster, Judge Bazelon noted that the standard by which the attorney's conduct is to
be measured is "reasonably competent assistance"; however, where the court-appointed
attorney has substantially violated his articulated duties to his client so as to impair
his client's defense, the court, under Bazelon's analysis, may presume that the client
was deprived of his sixth amendment right to a fair trial unless the Government rebuts
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deprive him of any personal judicial remedy against his court-appointed counsel. Dicta in Minns implied that the attorney's alleged misconduct in that
case was not the extreme misconduct that section 1983 was designed to prevent;5 5 absolute immunity, however, is by definition unconditional so long as
the attorney acts within the scope of his court appointment.5 6 Although
Minns referred to the alternate public remedy against the court-appointed
attorney under section 242, it is important to note that this criminal sanction
57
provides no private right of action and requires proof of specific intent.
Thus, the public action, because it is difficult to establish and prove, may
render the public remedy largely illusory. 58
Finally, Minns offers a disturbing assumption about the relationship between the indigent and his court-appointed attorney which had earlier been
given credence in Brown. Both cases stated that because indigents do not
pay for the legal services which they receive, they are more apt to be disthe presumption by showing that the consequences of the attorney's misconduct could
not have affected the trial court's verdict. Id. at 20-25. DeCoster has subsequently
been vacated and was reheard en banc on May 24, 1977.
55. 542 F.2d at 902.
56. Dicta in Brown v. Dunne, 409 F.2d 341, 343 (7th Cir. 1969), suggests that
immunity may not be available to the judge or attorney who performs a purely nonjudicial or wholly nondiscretionary act or when there is no need to protect the free
exercise of independent judgment. Both Senak and Brown v. Joseph recognized an exception to immunity "where the officials' acts are clearly outside the scope of [their]
jurisdiction." 477 F.2d at 307; 463 F.2d at 1048. Imbler explicitly reserved the question of whether immunity was required "for those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than
that of advocate." 424 U.S. at 430-31 & n.3,3. While the question remains open, the
most recent Supreme Court decision on point prior to Imbler stated that "immunity
applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly." Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Thus, although an exception to immunity may
exist for acts beyond the scope of the attorney's official functions, an exception based
on the absence of underlying policy considerations would seem to be unsupported by
present law.
57. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107 (1945) (specific intent required
under section 242).
58. The Senak case also shows that the appellate court's assumption that court-appointed attorneys act under color of law does not settle this issue but merely defers
proof on what should be a jurisdictional matter until the time of trial. 477 F.2d at
307. The trial court would remain free to reject the argument that the jurisdictional
requirement of section 1983 had been met.
In addition, Minns mentioned alternate private remedies which remain available to
the indigent, including the right to seek postconviction relief through direct appeal
or habeas corpus petition, to act as his own counsel, or to file a grievance against
the attorney with his state bar association. 542 F.2d at 902. However, given the fact
that virtually every indigent in Minns' position lacks not only personal freedom, but
the social and economic resources to pursue such relief, those other remedies are more
theoretical than realistic. Moreover, even if one of these alternate remedies is success-
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satisfied and to harass their attorneys than are paying clients.5 9 Therefore,
the Minns court concluded, court-appointed attorneys must be insulated from
such patently frivolous claims by granting them absolute immunity from section 1983 liability. Such an assumption, although perhaps valid in individual
instances, helps perpetuate the belief that "the criminal justice system is deliberately constructed and administered to protect the haves from the havenots and to perpetuate the status quo."6 0
IV.

CONCLUSION

Minns v. Paul,by granting absolute immunity to court-appointed attorneys,
illustrates the narrow construction given to section 1983 since that statute was
first heralded as a private federal tort remedy in Monroe v. Pape.6 Not
only has the section been construed to reach only certain kinds of wrongs
committed by specified persons, but some persons, though wrongdoers, have
been exempted from its reach because the public policy of protecting their
activities is considered more important than affording a private civil remedy
to victims of their wrongdoing. In granting immunity to court-appointed
attorneys, Minns emphasized the need for a rule of certainty to govern the
court-appointed attorney's activities, the desire to encourage capable people
to seek public service, and the availability of alternate remedies, both public
and private, for the attorney's misconduct.
In making its grant of immunity absolute, Minns foreclosed the possibility
that section 1983 could be used to compensate an indigent for either the intentional or negligent acts of his court-appointed attorney. By choosing to exempt court-appointed attorneys on the ground of immunity, instead of deciding that there was no state action to establish the court's jurisdiction under
the section, the court sought to preserve the public's right to prosecute courtappointed attorneys under section 242 of the United States criminal code.
The difficulty of proving such a case, however, makes this remedy ineffectual
in many circumstances and offers virtually no deterrence to the incompetent
court-appointed counsel whose failure to provide his client with zealous advocacy falls short of willful criminal neglect. While Minns recognized that the
indigent has access to other remedies, the court's decision has the practical
effect of eliminating a private monetary remedy for the person who has the
fully invoked, it does not compensate the individual for his public humiliation and the
economic hardships which his family has suffered while he remained imprisoned, due to
his attorney's neglect. See Wash. Post, Mar. 6, 1977, § B, at 7, cols. 3-4.
59. 542 F.2d at 901-02; 463 F.2d at 1049.
60. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1976, § 6, at 95, col. 1 (letter from William M. Kunstler).
61. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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fewest resources to protect his own interests and therefore probably needs
this remedy most. On balance, one is left with the suspicion that although
the Fourth Circuit's policy arguments are sound, the solution of absolute immunity for court-appointed attorneys under section 1983 may indeed be more
drastic than the problems that the court sought to avoid.
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